ISSUE 1-2006
INTERVIEW
STUDIES
Alexander Lengauer Отар Довженко Jan Marian Виктор Замятин
OUR ANALYSES
Олександр Ленгауер
REVIEW
Богдана Костюк
APROPOS
Rene Kubasek


Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in the articles and/or discussions are those of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views or positions of the publisher.

TOPlist
STUDIES
UKRAINE: LIFE AFTER THE ELECTIONS
(18.3.2006)
By Alexander Lengauer | Managing Director, CEC Government Relations - Ukraine, Ukraine | Issue 1, 2006

     The way of how Ukraine will live after the elections will define Ukraine’s politics and economy for the rest of 2006 and beyond. That is why unbiased estimation of outcomes of the nearest parliament elections is truly important for any forecasts of economic and political situation in Ukraine.

Electoral suggestions
     Therefore, the most probable cases of these elections outcomes, the stable and the two conformist scenarios should be considered first of all. At the moment, no one knows the probabilities of those scenarios since they are too subjective, however they are approximately equal and perhaps are around or less than 50% (because there is the third case, revenge of the current opposition, with a small chance).
     Why to differentiate configuration of parliament is so important? The type of parliamentary majority coalition will define response of the President Victor Yushchenko, and hence ways of conflicts or collaboration between the President and the parliament, which will appoint the new government.

     Formally, taking into consideration the most apparent numbers of seats by factions (see Table 1), there are four variants of possibly majority coalition. As it is clearly seen, there are three pillars for the coalition:
- Party of Regions (PR), headed by former nominee for President Victor Yanukovich and mainly sponsored by owner of SCM corporation Rinat Akhmetov,
- bloc NSNU, backed by the President,
- bloc BYUT, headed by former prime minister and Yushchenko’s ally Yulia Tymoshenko.

 Table 1.Possible structure of parliament after the elections

Party or bloc Seats range,
from ... to
Party of Regions (PR) 160-170
Popular Union “Our Ukraine” (NSNU) 95-105
Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYUT) 65-75
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) 35-40
Popular Bloc of Lytvyn (NBL) 25-30
Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) 25-30
Bloc of Natalia Vitrenko (PSPU) * 15-16
Blocs "Pora"-PRP or "Ne Tak" or "Viche" ** 0-15
Please note, that there are discrete probabilities:
* - for Vitrenko’s bloc, which rating is around the passing 3%, but often lower,
** - for 3 small participants, which nevertheless can take 3%, if they accelerate creativeness and advertising.

Namely the parliament three-pillar structure suggests 3 types of scenarios, as in Table 2. (although, in fact, the second scenario may be subdivided into two, depending on the “orange” partner for the Party of Regions).

 Table 2. Main scenarios for majority coalitions.

Scenario Majority coalition structure Relations to government forming Probability
Stable NSNU + BYUT + SPU + …

“Pora”-PRP + NBL or “Viche”

Government is approved High
Conformist 1) NSNU + PR

2) BYUT + PR

+ … NBL or “Viche” for both

Government is approved Rather high
Gov’t is probably not approved, new elections Rather low, but real
Revenge PR + CPU + NBL + PSPU either "Ne Tak" or "Viche" Gov’t is probably not approved, new elections Very low
Gov’t is surely not approved, new elections Extremely low

Besides, the “revolt” factors for abovementioned scenarios should be pointed out:

     First, that is group around former head of Presidential administration (of Leonid Kuchma) Victor Medvedchuk, the SDPU(united) party, core of the low-rated Opposition Bloc “Ne Tak” (“Other Way”). This person always benefits from crises, so he may indeed be interested in the new one, including new elections. If “Ne Tak” enters the parliament, it will increase probability of the revenge scenario.

     Second, there are still probabilities of overcoming 3% threshold by not only “Ne Tak” bloc, but also such participants as:
      “Viche” party (the latter can increase probability of the revenge scenario, but also can serve the golden share for the stable scenario, if the “orange” forces will get less votes and main sponsor of “Viche” Victor Pinchuk will be promised to have his companies, like NZF, without re-privatisation risks), and
      “Pora”-PRP (gives more for the stable scenario).

     Third, there is some probability, that Vitrenko’s bloc can be cancelled from the elections on the eve of the elections, for instance, by appeal of Ministry of Interior Affairs. Then votes for her bloc will be equally distributed amid all the winners, though Vitrenko may appeal to vote for the Party of Regions, what will not decrease probability of the revenge scenario, but may increase probability for both types of conformist scenario.

     Fourth, that is still unclear how Dnipropetrovsk region will vote. The “Gromada” party of Pavlo Lazarenko won elections-1998 mostly thanks to only this region. There is probability of wider support for Tymoshenko. She is from Dnipropetrovsk and she was supported during elections-2002 by the north-eastern part of the region, thanks by the Independent Trade Union of Coalminers, which leader is still on Tymoshenko’s side (although now mines linked with this region are under control of the SCM group, the key sponsor of the PR party). There are also special interests in this region expressed by large oligarchic groups Interpipe (of Pinchuk, key sponsor of “Viche”) and Privat (which has property conflict with Interpipe there and relies on NSNU now). The regional governor is too close to prime minister (of NSNU). Besides, this region was traditionally “red belt”, so CPU and PSPU may play some successful populist games there. So, the region may provide more scores for any scenario.

Politics after the elections
     Political situation, defined by the election results, the parliament majority coalition structure and the further constitutional reform development, will influence economical and social life the most.

     In the conformist scenario, there will be more conflicts with appointment of government and on regional level. This scenario also stimulates the opportunist wings both in NSNU and Party of Regions.
     Under the stable scenario, there could be two axis of conflicts, with appointment of prime minister (BYUT vs. NSNU) and speaker (BYUT vs. SPU), so BYUT leader Tymoshenko is the conflicting factor there.

     In both cases, conflicts among newly elected local councils and appointed by President heads of local state administrations should be expected. Another unavoidable conflict field includes use of courts, which decision will play temporary role of law substitutes. And in both cases parliament will not have enough time for law-making a couple of months after the elections, due to government and speaker tradeoffs. Both tradeoffs should be finished in late May – early June, so almost no time is left till the end of session in July.

     Majority coalitions. It is very important to estimate game behaviour between the President and the majority coalition. In short case, it is represented in Table 3 below.

 Table 3. Variants of coalition majority and Presidential responses.

Variants Majority actions President’s responses
Stable Stable continuation of the reformist course, close to President’s vision, appointment of government suitable for President. Complete support of any reformist initiatives of the majority.
Conformist (with NSNU) Compromise law-making initiatives, with taking into account President’s opinion, strong government tradeoffs. President may response with his veto right to stop unsuitable laws and threaten with not approving government. Finally some formal or informal council to resolve law-making crises may by established between the President and the majority.
Conformist (with BYUT) Law-making initiatives often differ from President’s vision, strong government tradeoffs inside the coalition and with the President. President may response with his veto right to stop unsuitable laws and threaten with not approving government. Permanent conflicts.
Revenge Law-making initiatives as a rule different from President’s wishes, government to be formed by Akhmetov’s views, with Yushcheko’s objections. President may response with his veto right to stop unsuitable laws and threaten with not approving government. Permanent conflicts, often initiated by the majority coalition.

     As it is seen, the conformist scenario with union of PR and BYUT is less winning for PR than that with NSNU. So, if there is need for PR to agree with the “orange” forces, it will choose rather NSNU. That will also mean split inside NSNU, where the conformist wing will try to agree with PR and to let down the President. Indeed, after the elections no one MP of the NSNU faction will be obliged Yushchenko – but will be able to act independently. So it is very important for the President not to pass the proper moment of the coalition agreements in order to prevent the PR-NSNU coalition. At the same time, the opportunist forces from NSNU will try to start any preliminary talks as soon the elections results will be known.
     Attempts to minimise size of any coalition, in order not to divide ministers’ portfolios in government with the other, and meanwhile to maximise its size, to get enough to form the majority (226 or more) can define such principles for coalitions’ sizes:

     In both conformist variants, their participants will set up duumvirate in the coalition – two participants are enough to form it;

     In stable and revenge variants the coalitions will attract as many participants as they need to form them (since both the “orange” forces and their opponents have not enough to set up coalitions independently). In such cases Lytvyn’s bloc and “Viche” (if entering parliament) may play role of golden share(s);

     No the constitutional majority (more than 300, enough to overcome Presidential veto on new laws) should be expected.

     The last remark means that the Presidential right of veto will become the exceptionally important tool that can minimise any opportunist and revanchist efforts. Any coalition will not be able to overcome Presidential veto (albeit the President will hardly veto laws by the “orange”-based coalition). They will need to agree. So, sooner or later, there will be established some kind of a consultative body, formal or informal, and seeking for compromise between the President and the any not “orange” coalition. What, in fact will not become absolute guarantees from crises.

     Government tradeoffs. The main tradeoffs after the elections will be about the post of prime minister, who will get main authorities of the executive power. It is still unclear who and what can be sacrificed in order to reach coalitional compromise. In any case, the coalition will be most probably formed by three core factions. They will be joined by some outsiders, which will get much less posts in government, if any at all.

     For the stable scenario, the main obstacle is position of Tymoshenko, who wants to be prime minister. She may propose a deal for the rest of apparent “orange” coalition (BYUT, NSNU, SPU, and maybe “Pora-PRP” , if takes 3%), according to which the participant which gets more votes will nominee prime minister. No one knows how she will behave, when the NSNU will get more. Conflict around prime minister can make the stable scenario really unstable one, but if it is solved, this scenario indeed brings stabilisation.

     In the case of the conformist scenario, there is also some instability caused by appointment of prime minister. It is logically to suggest, that compromise can be reached between sponsors of the Party of Regions (first of all Rinat Akhmetov, owner of SCM) and part of leadership of NSNU. That agreement will also finally define NSNU as not “President Victor Yushcheko’s people”, but as politicians and businessmen who play their own games. Meanwhile such agreement will cause splits in both NSNU and PR. In the first faction there will remain strong groups, which will continue to be extremely loyal to President, while in the second faction there will be formations of some groups, often out of Donetsk region, which will oppose to increase of influence of Akhmetov and his people – especially after they will take real power in the PR, leaving Yanukovich as used tool. Opportunism in NSNU is a serious risk factor.

     The extreme case of the revenge, when President will be able not to approve nominee for prime minister. That will mean dismissal of parliament and new elections. However it is risky for both sides. Risk for NSNU is that its opponents (PR, CPU, PSPU etc.) will get enough positions, often majorities in local councils, in during local elections (regional, municipal and district) to be held simultaneously with parliamentary ones. It means strong bridgeheads of the oppositions. Besides, some of aforesaid NSNU leadership can be uncertain about being included in new election lists. As for PR, the risk is mobilisation of the “orange” forces to prevent the new revenge and hence worse results for new voting. So both sides will tend to agree. For the Party of Regions it will suitable to share government with former opponents rather than to risk with new elections.

     However both scenarios, the conformist and revenge ones, have risk of Presidential not acceptance of the agreed nominee for prime minister (even if most of NSNU will vote “yep”). It means re-elections, but legally, there is no procedure what to do if parliament does not accept Presidential decision. To organise yet another “orange revolution” will mean to split the country (since the current opposition will already have majority in many local councils and still have developed working campaign teams). So, President will be also interested in compromise in the case of conformist scenario.

     Speaker tradeoffs. Under the constitutional reform, parliamentary speaker will obtain additional authorities (as far parliament gets more), still enjoying almost no responsibility. There are two most probable nominees for the speaker chair, current one and leader of NBL bloc Volodymyr Lytvyn, and former one and now leader of SPU Alexander Moroz. Demand for speaker from the third force, either NBL or SPU, is reasonably – then speaker can play a role of referee between the two leading factions of majority, in any case.

     Under the stable scenario Moroz has the best chances to become a speaker, acceptable by the “orange” coalition and actually balancing it. Additional tensions in this lobby fighting will happen if Yulia Tymoshenko joins it. Leader the BYUT bloc start understanding that the speaker chair can give her not less, but even more opportunities than post of prime minister (enough power, no responsibilities). So in spite of Moroz application for speaker in probable “orange” coalition, Mrs. Tymoshenko can easily change her requests to the “orange” allies, giving up executive branch of power in exchange for legislative one.

     In the case of conformist scenario, the most acceptable nominee, especially by the PR and by the opportunist part of NSNU, a speaker will be Lytvyn. His factions voted for dismissal of government in January 2006, proving that he was able to fight with the current President.

     Parliamentary lobbies. Formally, in new parliament there will a kind of imperative mandates for MPs. However, there are no restrictions for deputies how to vote. So in the Ukrainian case being an MP of a particular faction does not mean to vote as this faction decides. Many factions have sponsors from the same industries; some has from the same business groups.

     Therefore, besides faction there will be informal coalitions (and, quite possible formal industrial lobbies), which will vote in a way necessary for them, not for factions. This will be more widespread in the conformist case. Participants of such coalitions and lobbies will become mediators amid factions. Wider representation of large business in parliament (up to three hundreds millionaires) will also cause higher price for lobbying decisions.

     Conflicts and loopholes. Today the constitutional reform is in fact just amendments to Constitution. There are still no laws on President, government (the Cabinet of Ministers), and, formally, on parliament (however, the self-made Regulations of Verkhovna Rada exisit). Instead, there are laws on courts, prosecutor office, and local self-governance. After the elections local councils will renewed (in fact, partly, since many local deputies are going to be elected once more), while officials in courts and prosecutor offices will remain the same. Some of cited laws contain many loopholes, which can be effectively applied when conflicts due to uncertain duties of the power start. Very important risk factor is delay with appointment of new judges of the constitutional court, which could resolve conflicts between parliament and President. Most probably, voting and adjuration of new members of the constitutional court will take place in the last days of the last pre-election session of parliament.

     Besides, in the case of legal uncertainty (assumptions of the reform vs. desire of President, prime minister, parliament and local state administrations to maintain more authorities) namely courts will often play crucial role, especially under the conformist scenario. The important precedent was court decision on additional election round during Presidential elections-2004, which defined success of the “orange revolution”. In 2006, courts will play special role helping to solve legal conflicts in cases of uncertain definitions of authorities, or property rights. At the same time, prosecutor offices will provoke conflicts.

     There is high probability of conflicts between newly elected local councils, as a rule not headed by representatives from NSNU, and the heads of local state administrations (“governors” for regions, but also head of administrations for towns and districts). Conflicts will be more definite where the new opposition will take majority in councils. Reasons could be different, but they rather concern usage of local budgets or their distribution (for instance, state administrations vs. executive committees of councils). Conflicts around governors will start as early as from April. President will back governors and other heads of administrations since namely they mean stability guarantees for him. Such conflicts will happen in any case. In order to avoid such conflicts, President and backed by him NSNU are actively including “their” nominees into election lists for regional councils elections. That will help decrease conflicts between new local authorities and appointed by President governors after the elections.

     Foreign policy after the elections. No serious conflicts in foreign affairs. International support of both the power and the opposition will be weak.

     In the conformist case there will be weaker relations with the West, than in the stable case, but in general both scenarios will produce similar outcomes for foreign policy in 2006.

     West. The EU will accept any election result, even that of the opposition and realisation of the conformist scenario. The US will continue some soft pressure; also using US role in Ukraine’s joining the WTO, especially in the conformist case. Also, under the conformist scenario, there will be some slowing down in integration processes with the EC and NATO, while the stable one will help maintain current pace. The current power did not manage to create Ukrainian “success story”, which could attract sympathy of the Western politicians, investors and general public – and no such actions will be done in 2006.

     Russia. Some trade wars with Russia may provoke strong statements, not deeds. In the conformist scenario, such trade wars will possess selective character, being not against businesses supporting the Party of Regions and its allies. Under the stable scenario, such trade wars can be intensified. The integration projects will slow down, at least temporarily – till accession of both countries to the WTO.

     WTO. Risk that Russia will join the WTO before Ukraine (what is technically possible enough) stimulates more unity in industrial and political lobbies in any – either stable or conformist – cases. Today even the communists are not against the WTO (as their leader Petro Symonenko declared to the AmCham). However the necessary laws will be voted not in a jiffy. So the most realistic period of Ukraine’s joining the WTO is late 2006.

Economy after the elections
     Political confrontation, the elections and post-election clashes will not allow implementing institutional economic reforms, as usual. Moreover, it is hardly possible to wait for serious changes in the taxation system, since all such changes, according to Ukrainian legislation must be undertaken till July-August. After this period only decrease of tax rates is possible, what will hardly be implemented by the newly elected power (the elections have finished!), while President will rather declare his intentions.

     It is worth to note, that both scenarios will not produce too different results for economy in 2006 (the exception is closer ties with Russia in the conformist case, which will be reflected in “selective” nature of trade wars and more reluctant actions to solve natural gas issues, than in the stable case).

     Growth. All negative factors in growth – lower level of investments, problems with exports, still high taxes and now higher energy costs, and, of course, political instability – will continue influencing economy in 2006, although GDP growth rate in 2006 should be higher than that in 2005 (just 2,4%).

     Energy supply. The same situation with crude oil, as in 2005, will be going on in 2006 (the same rules for oil imports to Ukraine and the same Russian duties for Russian oil supplies). Some small increase could be expected what will hit domestic gasoline prices. Supply of natural gas demonstrates the more complicated situation. Compromise price for the first half of 2005 will be found with setting up JV “Ukrgaz-Energo” . While prices for Russian natural gas may become higher from the second half of 2006. The special role of gas distributor “Gas of Ukraine” will be in Ukrainian schemes of natural gas distribution. This distributing company may buy natural gas by single price for Ukrainian market and then sell it by different prices for different consumers – for households and for different industries.

     So increase of natural gas prices will be balanced enough and will not cause significant growth of production costs (and therefore efficiency) of Ukrainian economy till the end of 2006. Key Ukrainian industries, like metallurgy or chemical production, are ready to accept price increase up to range of $110-$160 per 1000 cubic metres. No fast energy saving measures should be expected. Recent gas “agreement” between Ukrainian and Russian sides will really work only during the first half of 2006. Further price increase should be expected after post-election political stabilisation.

     However sluggishness of Ukrainian side, especially parliament under the conformist scenario, will postpone decision of natural gas issues till autumn. Interestingly, but in the stable scenario case namely Ukrainian side may initiate changes in the “agreement” (while the Russian side may traditionally wait for the cold winter season).

     Foreign trade. Common suggestions that Ukrainian exports will decrease in 2006 because of lower world prices of metals are groundless. In fact, world prices are on high level, for instance, the metal index of the Economist Commodities Price Index in late 2005 reached its highest values for recent 17 years. After sluggish demand dynamics, new growth wave of demand for metal production has already started. Ukrainian metallurgists agree: the branch association “Metallurgprom” insists on production growth in 2006 of 5%-6%, thanks to demand in traditional markets. There are also no signs of serious world demand decrease for other key groups of Ukrainian exports. However, there are risks of trade sanctions against Ukrainian supplies.

     First of all, that concerns trade wars already initiated by Russian side. Such sanctions against Ukrainian goods can seriously hit some industries (confectionary, dairy, meat, pipe production), although export of such goods to Russia is not critical for Ukrainian economy in whole.

     Losses in Russian market can be partly compensated in the nearest months by domestic and some external markets. However, not by all other markets. Today Ukraine faces problems with exports to many EC countries (most of all, to half of new members and Germany). This decline was caused by restructuring of trade relations inside the EC (for new members), low economy growth rates (mostly Germany) and revaluation of Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) to euro. All this factors will work also in 2006, so there are objective obstacles to further increase of growth of Ukrainian exports to the EC.

     The trade wars like those with Russia can keep on until Ukraine’s joining the WTO, which is still opposed by many lobbies, first of all agrarian one. The risk of Russian entering the WTO before Ukraine will consolidate Ukrainian elite regardless political views. As a result, there will be parliamentary majority able to pass necessary amendments into Ukrainian legislation. Besides, Ministry of Economy will do its best to intensify process of Ukraine’s entering the WTO as soon as possible. The main WTO risk is the case when parliament will not manage to pass necessary amendments before the elections – then law-making procedures will be postponed to autumn. This risk because joining the WTO means more opportunities for Ukraine in further trade wars.

     Investments. Growth in capital investments significantly declined in 2005, being slightly over 3% (like in unstable mid-1990’s). Main investment losers are many industrial branches, construction and transport. Decline in industrial construction is seen in almost all regions. Volumes of FDI showed recovery after Tymoshenko’s government dismissal and are comparable with their volumes before Presidential elections-2004. No any significant increase of investing, both domestic and foreign (FDI) should be expected before the post-election certainty (i.e. government is formed and approved by President). Outcomes of such lagged investments in economy growth will be seen only from 2007. Important risk for investments is instability in local councils and their conflicts with heads of state administrations in regions, towns and districts. This risk factor can postpone investments to some regions for even longer period. Yet another factor that will slow down investment activities is relatively low share of state investments in state budget - 2006, which is more social.

     Finally, declared by many large companies IPO underwriting will become massive only from 2007 (e.g. by ISD), after end of financial year 2006. Despite coming of western banks from late 2005, bank credit resources for investing will remain too limited. Court system will still remain unreformed and hence corrupted in 2006.

     State budget and privatisation. No budget reform in 2006, not only due to conceptual contradictions, but also because of deadline (it must be accepted in a half a year in advance, but the post-election period till early summer will be time of division of the power in the country). Better tax collection discipline and money from privatisation of “Krivorizhstal” are enough to live in 2006 with the planned budget spending. In the worst case, another plant can be privatised.

     Main budget conflicts in 2006 will be caused by local authorities, which will try to obtain more in late 2006 and introduce new rules for 2007. Besides, there could be some additional amendments to budget-2006. State budget-2007 will be planned with the old tax base.

     There will be most probably no massive additional privatisation (like previously expected telecommunication monopolist “Ukrtelecom”). Just because there is anti-privatisation management in the State Property Fund, enough money from “Krivorizhstal” sale and not too much time to do so before the elections (while time lag is need after elections as well, in order to decide what to privatise and for whom to privatise). The exception can be introduction of mechanism of additional payments for previous not transparent privatisation bids (like that demanded by NZF, i.e. “Nikopol Ferroalloys Plant”). Because of scandalous nature, such practice will not become widespread.

     Taxes. No tax reform in 2006 – just because the conceptual contradictions and time limits, the same as in the case of budget reform. However there could be some amendments concerning decreasing some insignificant tax rates. Local authorities will keep on lobbying the local tax on real estate, not necessarily successfully.

     Social payments, population incomes and unemployment. All promised social payments will be done. Real incomes grow, for almost 20% in 2005. Similar incomes growth will continue in 2006:

  • First of all, thanks to continuation of social payments;
  • Second, due to wages growth (For the end of 2005, average wage in Ukraine reached UAH 1000 (around $200), increasing 45% for the last year, and it will continue to grow in 2006);
  • Third, after short decrease under Tymoshenko’s government, there is some revival in shadow economy (Ministry of Economy estimates that it is again over a third of all economy).

     That all will stimulate demand in domestic mass consumer market – and indirectly will support economy growth, especially growth in FMCG production and retail trade. That growth will also attract more investments to these branches. Moreover, income growth will also stimulate further growth of imports. But incomes will remain unequally distributed.

     After the lowest number of the unemployed in October 2006, unemployment started to grow again, now reaching around 7% by ILO international standards. In 2006 it will stabilise at a level up to 9% (by International Labour Organisation methodology). President’s promise to create additional 5 mn workplaces will not be realised soon.

     Inflation and monetary policy. Current inflation is high, around 10% for both consumer prices and prices of producers (annual volumes for 2005). Most probably, inflation for 2006 will be at similar levels. It is noteworthy, that gap between officially declared inflation volumes and real ones, significant in 2005, will only widen in 2006. It is also important to remind, that despite the elections management of the National Bank of Ukraine will not be changed.

     The National Bank of Ukraine will do its best to stabilise monetary policy (with steady growth of monetary aggregates). It will keep inflation low, but, since still non-monetary nature of Ukraine’s economy, the National Bank’s influence to stabilisation of economy is pretty limited. However hryvnia exchange rate will be maintained stable.

     More details on the most probable volumes of key economic indicators see in Table 4 below:

 Table 4. Key economic indicators for the end of 2006

Forecasted values Our forecast as
apparent range, from … to
Our comments on

forecasts

GDP growth % 3 – 4 Higher than in 2005 thanks to more consumer demand
Industrial output growth % 5 – 7 Due to restructured demand for B2B productions
Export of goods growth % 5 – 9 Risks of lower world prices
Import of goods growth % 10 – 15 Thanks to consumer demand import rate will remain high
Capital investments growth % 4 – 8 Some recovery after the elections
Population incomes growth % 15 – 18 Stabilisation in incomes
Retail turnover growth % 19 – 22 As high as now
CPI inflation % 9 – 12 Some increase is possible because of growing incomes
PPI inflation % 8 – 15 Some increase is possible because of still high production costs
Unemployment, by ILO standards % 8 – 9 Increase caused by general slowing down
Currency reserves NBU $ bn 17 – 21 Increase due to still high exports
UAH to $, official NBU rate - 5.05 – 5.10 Stability thanks to the National Bank policy
Annual credit rate (for UAH) % 13 – 15
Monetary base growth % 20 – 25
Money in circulation (M3) growth % 25 – 30

Print version
EMAIL
previous CAN WE EXPECT MAJOR CHANGES AFTER THE UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS? |
УКРАИНСКОЕ ТЕЛЕВИДЕНИЕ В ПРЕДВЫБОРНОМ РЕЖИМЕ
(18.3.2006)
|
Отар Довженко
next
ARCHIVE
2016  1 2 3 4
2015  1 2 3 4
2014  1 2 3 4
2013  1 2 3 4
2012  1 2 3 4
2011  1 2 3 4
2010  1 2 3 4
2009  1 2 3 4
2008  1 2 3 4
2007  1 2 3 4
2006  1 2 3 4
2005  1 2 3 4
2004  1 2 3 4
2003  1 2 3 4
2002  1 2 3 4
2001  1 2 3 4

SEARCH
NEWSLETTER

mail
www.jota.cz
www.telekritika.ua www.amo.cz
RSS
  © 2008-2017
Russkii Vopros
Created by b23
Valid XHTML 1.0 Transitional
Valid CSS 3.0
MORE Russkii Vopros

About us
For authors
UPDATES

Sign up to stay informed.Get on the mailing list.